Rationality in Economics: How to Face Climate Change?
Abstract
Abstract: The Homo economicus model has limitations in capturing prosocial and pro-environmental motivations and behavior. Besides the traditional “value-free” conception of rationality, alternative conceptions have emerged in economics, including the bounded rationality approaches of D. Kahneman or H. Simon, or the ecological rationality introduced by G. Gigerenzer. One of the most recent approaches is that of Felin and Koenderink (2022), who introduced “generative rationality” (GRA). In this paper, we are among the first to extend the potential of GRA to economics, climate change, its management and ethics. We also discuss this potential through a taxonomy of different models of rationality in economics.
The paper attempts to survey different conceptions of rationality in economics and to introduce Felin & Koenderink’s “Generative Rationality Approach” (GRA) as a potentially fruitful framework for understanding prosocial and pro-environmental behavior, especially in the context of climate action as a global social dilemma. Unfortunately, I don’t recommend acceptance as is, since it has several significant weaknesses:
Conceptually, it remains quite superficial both on the side of GRA and on the side of existing rationality approaches. The paper repeatedly asserts that GRA is fundamentally different than bounded/procedural/ecological approaches, but these claims are not demonstrated rigorously. The survey of “inflation of rationalities” and “family of bounded rationality approaches” is useful as a basic pedagogical overview, but for a research paper it is too elementary. As it stands, large parts read like a literature review section of a master’s or PhD thesis rather than a publishable contribution.
The climate change angle is largely rhetorical: there is very little engagement with climate economics or with the actual structure of climate-related social dilemmas. Policy implications are highly abstract, the paper repeatedly claims that GRA allows “more context-specific policies”, “relevance-based foundations”, “situationally relevant policies”, but provides no concrete example of how a climate policy would look different if designed under GRA as opposed to ERA or standard behavioral insights.
The “methods” and “results” sections are misleadingly framed in quasi-empirical terms for what is essentially a narrative essay. This framing is unnecessary and confusing. It gives an impression of methodological rigor that is not actually present, and it sits uneasily with the essentially essayistic nature of the argument. The structure should be re-cast in more appropriate terms (e.g. “Conceptual framework”, “Critical assessment”, “Implications”).
I recommend that the authors deepen and clarify the reconstruction of GRA and focus on specific points of tension where GRA genuinely changes how we think about experimental design, interpretation of heuristics, or the nature of preferences. Also, they should show, concretely, how GRA would change economic analysis of climate action, by providing at least one detailed case or scenario (e.g. a public-goods game, a field experiment on energy use, or a policy instrument) redesigned under a GRA lens. They should clarify how this differs in practice from what ecological rationality or behavioral public policy already recommend.
Dear Reviewer,
thank you for your important and inspiring comments on our paper. We will carefully consider your suggestions and try to incorporate them into the article.
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