

Hierarchical Inconsistencies: A Critical Assessment of Justification

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Abstract

The existential insecurity of human beings has induced them to create protective spheres of symbols: myths, religions, values, belief systems, theories, etc. Rationality is one of the key factors contributing to the construction of civilization in technical and symbolic terms. As Hankiss (2001) has emphasized, protective spheres of symbols may collapse – thus causing a profound social crisis. Social and political transformations produced a tremendous impact at the end of the 20th century. As the result, management theories have been revised in order to deal with transition and uncertainty. Francis Fukuyama's (2000) approach is supportive of hierarchical organization as the best solution when facing a 'disruption'. The notion of *Homo Hierarchicus* has been based on, allegedly, rational presumptions. This paper contributes to the discussion regarding the hierarchy within contemporary organisation. It criticises so-called 'natural' and 'rational' necessities justifying a hierarchy. A key issue identified by the paper is the formalisation of language in claiming value-free knowledge and 'detached' observation as the basis for neutral rationality and aspired efficiency. This should be seriously reconsidered as abetting rather than aiding understanding of social complexity. All in all, *Homo Hierarchicus* appears to be misleading rather than helping symbolic sphere or construct.

Key words: Rationality Bureaucracy Hierarchy Complexity

JEL: B50, M14, Z13

1. Introduction

The most usual definition of management mainly refers to an act of making a decision in accordance to interests and goals of certain organization. It means, that 'organized' people can be divided into two major groups: ones who make decisions and others who implement decisions. Even the simplest kind of organisation indicates the presence of hierarchical order which ensures that decisions are smoothly (as much as possible) implemented. There are diverse and complicated forms of organisational hierarchy including many chains of middle-management with various levels of autonomy. Hierarchy is

a formal structure of organisation maintained by officially approved rules. A fundamental slogan of managing human activities in hierarchical way is "Efficiency and more of efficiency". The efficient organisation is supposed to achieve the maximum of results at the minimum of costs. Not surprisingly, a formal structure needs a formal language purified from all imperfections of ordinary language like vagueness or too ambivalent interpretation. Guidance and commands must be produced and feedback reports must be delivered through formalised lines what should guarantee the most exact content of information transferred. Mathematics is a scientific instance of formal language. So, it is not a coincidence that management within hierarchical organisations is permeated by quantitative techniques. But do they provide adequate assistance? A mathematician has a privilege to be engaged primarily with abstract concepts and patterns on theoretical level. For example, physicists, as scientists studying natural phenomena, are not completely satisfied with the assistance of mathematics. The formal language can be helpful but its rigour has not been always adequate to studied phenomena which does not easily surrender to formal treatment. In this case a poetical practice may be more relevant. This is Bohr's advice to Heisenberg (1971), Manin (1981) shares the same sentiment. Hankiss (2001) also has implied that "compatibility of mathematics (and human reason behind it) with the universe is questionable" (p. 196). Dyson (1979) has a brilliant memories how discussions among physicists and mathematicians were proceeded under Oppenheimer at Princeton. Social phenomena are more complicated than natural ones but social sciences are invaded by formalisms in no less a way. Leontief (1982) has expressed a big concern regarding too much of applied mathematics within economics. Formal approaches have introduced fatalistic and static notions into social sciences absolutely ignoring human values and indulging in 'routinized' procedures. Bourdieu (2004) has presumed that too many mathematicians retreated to social sciences in search for safer shelter due to their inability (or incompetence) to secure academic career in theoretical mathematics. However, social sciences were institutionalised just at the end of the 19th century, later than natural sciences (Wagner, 2001). It is a common practice in methodological disputes to juxtapose social and natural sciences. The impressive success of Newtonian physics has established long standing standards for scientific method. However, Russell (1956) has pointed out opposite case when social theory induced a breakthrough in natural sciences - Darwin's theory of evolution. Many contemporary social scientists enjoyed introducing evolutionary ideas from biology into social sciences in order to oppose mechanistic trends. Such as the concept of evolutionary economics in contrast to conventional equilibrium economics which is too much captivated by mechanical models of rationality and perfect information (Metcalf, 1998). So called, Neo-Darwinism has thrived by coupling social and natural sciences thanks to complexity and evolution theories (Khalil and Boulding, 1996). Russell (1956) has indicated that Darwin himself could not derive evolution theory from the previous achievements of natural sciences. For example, geology was not developed enough to be finally independent from the orthodox theology at the first half of the 19th century. According to Russell (1956), Darwin's theory was no more than generalisation of everyday experience. And this generalisation has disguised certain affirmative values dependent on specific historical context. It creates impersonal frameworks of power sustaining all kinds of hierarchy.

The discussion about rationality and human values in science also may have some implications for management issues. Science is more theoretical and speculative.

Management is a more practical activity. The realms of concern related to social sciences and management do not totally coincide but do overlap. All in all, the social sciences and management face a common problem of human values only differently accentuated. Both value-free science and formalistic management are completely idealistic concepts and inadequate to reality. But nothing else drives human beings so much as ideas with ideological flavour. All that needs to be done within a neoliberal paradigm is just a proper constraint of informal imperfections. According to Myrdal (1944), all conflicts of values in social sciences are resolved through rationalisations which bridge incoherencies by belief systems. Absolutely formal management is very rigid and inflexible like strict bureaucracy. They are doomed to failure of performance in case of new unexpected challenges in economy, society, politics, and military.

The management as an act of making decisions and of organising is directly dependent on norms and values. Normativity has framed and directed all human actions. A rational machinery of capitalism is trying to tame and to domesticate informal human values in usual way of “capitalisation”. That is why the notion of social capital has been introduced. The properly handled social capital should become another useful factor for profit making. But the model of social capital has been flawed from the beginning. Actually, it is one of the best examples that zealous commitment to rationality is itself irrational (Stiglitz, 2010). The whole division of human values into formal/informal and rational/arational is something inappropriate in the 21st century because of obsolete Cartesian dualism of mind and body. But it is exactly what the prophet of rationality and Rockefeller type of intellectual Fukuyama (2000) is trying to do. He is a grand thinker but his inclinations on validating the presence of hierarchies by ‘human nature’ contain pseudo-religious flavour like also fake entity of Homo Hierarchicus.

2.1 The Great Inconsistencies of Fukuyama

Fukuyama’s book “The Great Disruption” (2000) is some sort of response to the rising civil society and new ideas regarding a reconfiguration of organisational framework in order to replace hierarchical structures by spontaneous networks having higher degree of freedom. It sounds like discarding vertical top-down framework of domination and introducing horizontal spontaneous network with less hierarchy. This seems very promising and Fukuyama (2000) does not attack that idea straightforwardly. And he is right in own terms because this classification of social order (hierarchical order vs. spontaneous order) is endorsed by him personally. There should be some precautions in order to analyse Fukuyama’s ‘rational’ proposal because it hides a rhetorical trap with arbitrary extreme cases of “hierarchy” and “spontaneity”. It should be relevant to follow Barthes’s (1992) advice, “...how absurd it is to try to contest our society without ever conceiving the very limits of the language by which (instrumental relation) we claim to contest it: it is trying to destroy the wolf by lodging comfortably in its gullet” (p. 8). Fukuyama (2000) is very well aware about complex systems and chaos theory which cannot be denied. Self-organised non-deterministic ‘schools’ are common case in the nature. But his universe of norms (Fukuyama, 2000, p. 148) is framing an intentionally selected piece of reality. It is a very ambiguous framework because this kind of “selection” is close to arbitrary “creation” or “symbolic construction”. In other words, it is an ideological preaching in the name of “rationality” with guise of “objectivity”. The selective interpretation of meaning and

manipulative game with causal links imposes certain affirmative values. Fukuyama (2000) has assigned to social capital all norms which prevail outside hierarchical authorities. Obviously, the idea is to combine social capital and civil society in order to ground and purify the presence of authority. Following Fukuyama (2000), hierarchy is a source of formal social rules imposed by authority (bureaucratic, religious, etc.) and spontaneously generated norms which mostly are informal, inherited. The definition of rational norms has indicated what is wrong with rationality itself – allegedly, these norms are chosen after rational choice in rational discussion. The only discrepancy in this definition is, namely, who sets the terms of discussion. The whole scheme displaying how norms are distributed has merely illusory appearance of symmetrical allocation. All arational and spontaneously generated norms are presupposed to pass a “filter” of rationality and hierarchy. Alternatives are left aside as rejected and unapproved (or just simply ignored and not considered) till the next ‘rational discussion’.

Within hierarchy the authority ‘makes rational choice’ from available “pool” of spontaneous and informal norms. The definition of rational choice is inconsistent due to inability to define exactly what is meant a “rational”. More than this, Kagan (2009) has pointed out, that

A popular definition of a rational decision asserts that it is the best means of gratifying a wish based on a conclusion derived from the gathering of an optimal amount of information. This abstract definition fails to stipulate the best means of gratifying a desire or the meaning of an optimal amount of information. p. 169

The presence of sovereign authority has presupposed the dialectical tension between ‘rational’ and ‘arational’ like that one in paradox of Master and Servant relation introduced by Hegel. The major idea behind this paradox is that Master and Servant cannot exist without each other because they fulfil each other’s existence despite hierarchical conflict. Fukuyama’s (2000) four-quadrant matrix has reduced a complex world into a picture with fixed and polarized categories. It’s a partial worldview and a perfect example of ‘applied metaphysics’ as warned long ago by Marx (1937 [1847]). Following him, everything which is reduced to logical categories has been just the abstraction of social relations. F. Fukuyama’s (2000) approach has been entangled with his own religious sources even though exclusively referring to Max Weber. It seems that Fukuyama (2000) has attempted to extend a Weberian framework upon current social issues but this intellectual jump from the end of the 19th century has been ended as naïve “Americanism” with self-confident superiority. The most explicit of Fukuyama’s (2000) examples of social disruption are from non-Puritan areas like Latin America or Southern Italy (pp. 17 – 18). Puritanism in his sense is a bridge transferring informal family values into external formalised activities such as doing business. Fukuyama (2000) has intended to present more soft and flexible version of ‘Newtonian mechanistic’ top-down organisational structure. The 21st century represents quite challenging time period for that kind of hierarchical organisations with deeply ingrained formal routines. For example, the management theory has been seriously considering biological metaphors for organic bottom-up organisations. So, in order to counteract anti-hierarchical trends in management theory Fukuyama (2000) has saved his own “biological” argument for Homo Hierarchicus – “people by nature like to organize themselves hierarchically” (p. 222). The main idea behind this statement is transmitted in strikingly “obvious” terms: the dominance in hierarchy

increases the level of serotonin in the brain according to the studies of chimpanzees' competitive sexual selection and their fights for alpha male status. Fukuyama (2000) has equated it to the similar impact of antidepressants known as SSRIs (selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors) with such brand names like Prozac, Zoloft, Celexa, etc. Besides that, he has claimed that higher status within hierarchy brings better emotional reward because recognition is supposed to be one of the basic social needs for human beings. And this is exactly the same point where Fukuyama's (2000) *Homo Hierarchicus* project starts to fall into pieces not reaching the final stage.

2.2 The Problem of Prediction

The explanation of phenomenon in causal terms has always persisted in the realm of cause-effect studies. It has become a formal way of "doing a proper science". Effectively revealed causal links enables to predict future processes or to retrodict into the past but this is only a part of the story. The prediction and retrodiction have remained as ideal forms of scientific activity which still has not been realised throughout sciences. The overwhelming success of Newtonian physics for a while had provided universal paradigm to be followed by all scientists. But later discoveries of natural sciences, especially in biology and chemistry, were not completely affirmative in regard to this mechanistic approach. Human behaviour, as social processes in general, does not obey to certain "laws" though some regularities and patterns may exist. Besides which, even physics including thermodynamics, quantum mechanics and complexity theory does not wholly rely on Newtonian and Cartesian premises. Predictability assumes controllability, such as ability to control future events and prevent crises. But historical record of successful social predictions is not impressive. The problem is not the precision itself but the whole concept of cause-effect. The expectations built on past regularities and routines cannot help to avoid huge disasters and failures in the future. The mechanism of cause-effect works pretty well in mechanics in clockwork fashion. The decreasing power of Church and religion has empowered a new secular theology of amelioration – a progress. This way of reasoning presupposes the developmental pattern of growth towards 'higher' social forms. The dependence of current state on previous one means the ability (or, at least, the aspiration) to predict future state. This is a backbone of the linearity concept or, in other words, reversibility.

The notion of reversibility is borrowed from classical physics. With given laws and formulas it enables precisely to retrodict or predict the past or future states of physical processes. In case the precision is unachievable it can be replaced by the calculus of probability. One of the prominent model assumptions of this kind is Markov Chain – a sequence of vectors with probability criterion where each vector in sequence depends only on previous state. A probability gives a wider account for quantifiable result but it still has retained a restraining power. So, not surprisingly, deterministic predictions or probabilistic calculations are quite useful in sustaining hierarchical structures because they frame strategical planning and provide top-down consolidation. But social complexity and uncertainty do not surrender themselves to finite formalisms as easily as the theory may expect. First of all, future oriented calculations and planning tend to disguise the projection of many interest for maintaining power relations within hierarchies. The hierarchical organisation projecting itself into the future needs some sort of 'clarity window' based on rational values. It is like a set of parameters within which organisation fits itself. And,

consequently, each link (or position, or employee) in hierarchy is granted a permission to act within certain limits of responsibility. It gives a false sense of security and consistency because social reality consists of non-linear processes too. This is a precise example of reducing human existential experience into narrow and false symbolic concepts (Hankiss, 2001). In this case the remark of Davidson (1998) is very relevant thus suggesting the notion of accuracy (meaning “care to obtain conformity with fact or truth”) instead of precision (meaning “sharpness to minute detail”). Maybe, the conformity with truth is also unrealistic even if it seems less dogmatic and not so trapped by perfectionism. In the case of hierarchical organisation precision and perfection denote the fear of loose interpretation. To put it simply, the precision of formal language is supposed to transfer orders and reports in most possible plain way without losses of information. But formalisms do not make anything simpler, they compartmentalise reality into fixed concepts with permanent meanings. This kind of affirmative permanence has ideological or even a theological flavour. It encloses organisation within restricted forms of behaviour and firm (but narrow) directions for the future. Presumably, evolutionary development favours “the fittest” capable to exploit opportunities and to calculate possibilities. But quite often the notion of “fitness” is taken out of context and separated from the idea of adaptive processes. Thus “fitness” has become a justification for current state of affairs as a frozen moment in the presence. From this point of superiority the future is predicted and the past is retrodicted in terms of higher authorities within hierarchical structures.

Interestingly, yet this does not provide with genuine picture of future but also distorts the past. Critical analysis has suggested that from historical perspective rational explanation is mere a foundational myth. The modern theology of progress and rationality is relatively young one and not necessarily indispensable. It has managed to become dominant due to the rise of capitalism in the 19th century. Mechanistic worldview and large-scale industrialisation have imposed a belief that “discovered” social laws will pave a way to the brighter future and more sustainable society with fewer grievances. All what has been expected is just to follow and obey ‘invisible’ market forces. In this regard, Russell (1956) has issued a relevant warning, “the same laws which produce growth also produce decay” (p. 81). Supposedly “discovered” social laws should be better declared as coincident regularities and routines. Holland and Oliveira (2013) following Hume and Smith have indicated the deficiencies of premise-dependant ‘systems thinking’, “...Hume’s stress that what is perceived depends on the habitual dispositions and values of the perceiver, has implications for suggesting that that there is no ‘value free’ social science and while decision makers on markets allegedly have been guided, as it were, by an invisible hand, most of them have been driven by values, beliefs and dispositions less than consciously acquired from life experience and education...” (p. 48). Hoover (2003) has recounted one of the insightful reflections by Isaiah Berlin that human beings tend “to find a unitary pattern in which the whole world of experience, past, present, and future, actual, possible, and unfulfilled, is symmetrically ordered” (p. 220). Hierarchical structure of organisation, as it is expected, should ensure the survival and maintain institutional ‘fitness’ within economy. Bankrupt of firms usually are explained in rational terms like miscalculations of management, inability to react to the change of demand, modified market regulation by government, etc. But deeper analysis can reveal the inner self-destructive drive within ‘rational expectations’. This is a vicious circle – an irrational adherence to rational value-free modelling. The

impressive failure in 1998 of speculative hedge fund Long Term Capital Management, run by the Nobel laureates Merton and Scholes, has exemplified the inconsistency between econometric predictability and real market fluctuations. 'Scientific method' did not help in managing long-term financial investments. Highly sophisticated mathematical calculations ignored Keynes's claim "that there was no basis for predicting long-term expectations since these depended on group and mass psychology" (Holland, 2015, p. 115). Certainly, the 'fitness' of many firms needs to be "corrected" by external market regulators like in case of tightening the control of financial sector. Cause-effect reasoning has imposed ideological, socially conditioned and institutional constraints in unjustified apotheosis of market rationality (Holland, *ibid.*).

2.3 The 'Rise and Fall' of Homo Hierarchicus

For such reasons there is a need also to reassess Homo Hierarchicus. Hierarchy does not fit everybody. It is rather an imposed pattern of organisation. Fukuyama (2000) has categorised social norms to formal/informal (rational/arational) to distinguish values which could be helpful to argument for hierarchies and to understate alternative proposals. But his statements like assigning informal values to organised crime or promoting hierarchy as more transparent than networks do not seem persuasive enough. It is quite noticeable that author feels about it similarly. And here comes the strongest arguments tested in various ideological battlefields – biological and religious ones. The invoked 'by nature' really sounds like unquestionable ruling by a judge without any right to lodge an appeal. Serotonin as a chemical compound within human brains is widely expected to be a physical substance of happiness or good psychological well-being. The shortage of serotonin and depression is a causal link admitted in psychiatric practice. Fukuyama (2000) has operated a double causal link of serotonin – non-depression and non-depression - hierarchy. And, of course, chimpanzees because they are always first, before human beings. But let's leave chimpanzees aside now, they simply deserve some respect. The series of causal links in linear fashion are used to build an argument but sometimes they conceal serious gaps. For example, the problem with serotonin addresses the challenge of analysing statistical data and interpreting medical research. Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) is a very popular group of antidepressants which increases the level of serotonin in brain thus presumably curing of the depression. But there is extremely disturbing statistical data of antidepressants' consumption (it presupposes a distinct market with certain patterns of consumer behaviour), especially in the United States. According to the US National Health and Nutrition Examination Surveys 2005 – 2008 (by National Centre for Health Statistics – NCHS), antidepressants were the third most common prescription drug taken by Americans of all ages and the most frequently used by persons aged 18 – 44 years in 2005 – 2008. Thanks to Pratt, Brody and Qiuping Gu (2011) who have sorted out NCHS data, there is indicated nearly 400% increase of antidepressant use in the United States among all ages from 1988 – 1994 through 2005 – 2008. Some eleven percent of Americans aged 12 years and over take antidepressant medication. Of course, antidepressants are used to treat not only depression but also various forms of anxiety disorders. The problem has gained a truly pandemic scale and if Fukuyama's causal links are reversed it can be tempting to discuss a failing idea of hierarchy within modern society. But there is no need "to play" under the same principles of cause-effect reasoning. People can be frustrated and anxious, many of them search for the easiest and simplest solution in order to counterbalance experienced

emptiness in contemporary society such as Durkheim's anomie. It is obvious that classical hierarchical systems cannot provide a relevant answer to actual social challenges. It does not sound as adequate proposal. Troubled people cannot necessarily find a suitable hierarchy to 'fit in'. Indeed, hierarchy itself may be more a problem than a solution. This story of serotonin shows how it is possible to reverse cause and effect in order to manipulate people's mind. As also Hume's ("An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding", [1748]) case that while we can assume cause-effect, we cannot necessarily prove it. The biological foundations of human behaviour cannot be reduced to mechanistic interplay in terms of formal models. The supposedly failing mechanism should be fixed by replacing broken parts or by refuelling. Such way of reasoning has monopolised the decision making by disseminating rigid patterns of solutions which become strictly protected by copyright.

But the monopoly of expertise does not assure the relevance of problem treatment despite assumed objectivity and rationality. Ubiquitous formalisms pretend to claim undistorted universality but social complexity (and critical thinking) has eroded this worldview. Kagan (2009) has noted that "current obsession with the biological bases for all deviant behaviors or unwanted moods" (p. 54) is due to increasing political power of the major pharmaceutical companies. Kirsch (2014) has made a thorough analysis of pharmaceutical tests for antidepressants. It has revealed many issues on institutional, industrial and theoretically scientific level regarding the regulation of market and researches on serotonin. If depression is treated according to chemical imbalance theory then a lack of serotonin is supposed to be a primary reason of illness. But there is a wide range of side effects of antidepressants'. Sexual dysfunction affects 70 – 80% of patients on selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), long-term weight gain, insomnia, nausea, and diarrhoea. Kirsch (2014) has indicated that approximately 20% of patients attempting to quit taking antidepressants show withdrawal symptoms similar to seeking to addiction. Other issues include increased idealisation of suicide among children and young adults, increased risks of stroke and death among older adults, increased risk of miscarriage or birth malformations for pregnant women. With the consequence that "antidepressants increase the risk of relapse after one has recovered" (Kirsch, 2014, p. 132). This analysis has uncovered that serotonin has a shaky foundations. It also is possible that the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) use flawed procedures to approve drugs. While reviewing pharmaceutical trials Kirsch and his colleagues did not find any significant differences between antidepressants and placebos. More simply, human beings are too complex to be cured by single chemically synthesized switches like selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs). Kirsch has proposed a combination of psychotherapy, antidepressants and alternatives such as physical exercises or acupuncture as the best treatment for depression. Antidepressants should be prescribed only as a last resort in severe cases. Thus the story of serotonin has shown much more complex interactions than the simple cause-effect relations assumed by many in the medical hierarchy.

Similarly, the hierarchical mode cannot be supported by religious, or to be more precise, Puritanical sentiment. Fukuyama (2000) has referred to Weber in promoting the importance of Puritanism for establishing market relations and values which are commonly known as capitalism. The initial economic success in accordance with political and military power of state has strengthened the global dominance of capitalism. As any kind of evangelism, capitalism does not tolerate opposing values of 'alternatives'. A peaceful

coexistence does not automatically presuppose a tolerance, it can disguise a self-indulgence with satisfied (or delusional) superiority feeling. The diffusion of 'free' market values has been always followed by the shadow of religion. So to speak, the technique of conversion was impressively elaborated within religious practices. Even now the term 'conversion' has been used with strong religious flavour outside confessional usage. Moral values do not emerge from aside human experience (like out of nothing) despite being imposed by certain authorities. Anyway, there is a strong trend to incline that universal values should be cleansed from subjective differences in order to remain objective and rational. Fukuyama's (2000) way of reasoning is permeated with evangelicalism. According to him and drawing uncritically on Weber, the merit of Protestant revolution "was not so much that it encouraged honesty, reciprocity, and thrift among individual entrepreneurs, but that these virtues were for the first time widely practiced outside the family" (Fukuyama, *ibid.*, p. 18). He submits that a more advanced and developed religion (i.e., Puritanism) has outmatched a backward one (i.e., Catholicism). By contrast, Tawney (1956) has been strongly critical of Weber, submitting that in his "Religion and the Rise of Capitalism". The Protestant Reformation should not be monolithic movement solely responsible for the rise of capitalism.

Fukuyama (2000) goes further with the "purification" process in his view how rational/formal values are constructed, deploying the concept of social capital, as "purification" on behalf of society. For example, informal values are good in maintaining family's bonds but in public affairs may result in nepotism. Yet Fukuyama "restrains" informal values within a double straitjacket. First as just indicated, he 'capitalises' them under high sounding label 'social capital', which has advantages and disadvantages. For, by analogy with physical capital, there is a big danger of destructive misuse. Physical capital can be turned into production of killing devices, while social capital can sustain organized crime or nepotism. Secondly, the label 'capital' itself presupposes the existence and even necessity of an owner or efficient manager. It is a sin to mismanage a capital, which needs a higher authority, implies the need for a secular saviour and rationality embodied in formal hierarchies. Everything has to be under control. A "purified" social capital has to be embodied in formal hierarchies for the common good. Fukuyama's (2000) rational procedure of "purification" therefore should eliminate the deficiency of informal values (social capital). So called objective outcome of this process should gain some sort of universality such as in the hierarchical structures of modern organisations. The problem is that this pattern does not fit social reality. Fukuyama's approach is not convincing because it is constructed on flawed cause-effect reasoning. There is nothing wrong with cause-effect reasoning in physics or engineering but human behaviour has too much of uncertainty. Too big preoccupation with cause-effect framework for social reality has something arational in itself. Though Fukuyama (2000) has indicated Puritanism as initial driving force for universal and rational values, the question still remains to be answered: does the hierarchy originate out of necessity to control a chaos of informal values? Is there any need to "purify" them? The question is valid, but the answer is complex. For, as Tawney, with reason, submits:

...The heart of man holds mysteries of contradiction which live in vigorous incompatibility together. When the shrivelled tissues lie in our hand, the spiritual bond still eludes us. In every human soul there is a socialist and an individualist, an authoritarian and a fanatic for liberty, as in each there is a Catholic and a Protestant. Tawney, 1954, p. 176

The developmental way of reasoning since the 19th century has been captivated by the idea of directional evolution. It has a tendency to assume a coherent direction of change that monopolizes foresight by narrowing a range of alternatives. Besides which, it requires a set of criteria to validate a proper or 'higher' phase of development in comparison with previous one. The directional development supplies a narrative about uniting the previous scattered lines of evolution into common one containing shared aspirational values. It resembles a graphical structure of hierarchy – lower-ranking positions subordinated to middle-management which is accordingly subordinated to superior management, etc. At the highest end of each hierarchy is the head of organization who embodies the aspiration for growth and delineates intra-hierarchical relations. But Fukuyama's reasoning about the rise of hierarchy and, respectively, Homo Hierarchicus is dependent on 'rational' simplifications. The idea of cause-effect itself isolates explained phenomena in order to avoid complications. It is a closed system of thought mainly preoccupied with closed models in order to be secured from 'distortions'. As the result, a model has been separated from reality, and studied phenomena have been explained endogenously. For example, the notion of 'free market' is explained separately from society and state. In this case a 'free market' has been endowed with its own laws of interaction and evolution – rational expectations, equilibrium, the survival of the fittest, etc. Braudel (1992) following Karl Polanyi has strongly criticised this sort of approach, "...the economy is only a 'subdivision' of social life, one which is enveloped in the networks and constraints of social reality and has only disentangled itself recently (sometimes not even then) from these multiple threads" (pp. 225 – 226).

3. Conclusion

A hierarchical structure for an organisation is justifiable and necessary in many areas of public administration and business. But from a critical and historical point of view it is not plausible to justify a hierarchy because of 'natural' and 'rational' necessity. It leaves out of picture many creative and productive alternatives on how to organise and manage social activities. The human aspiration to tame Nature has turned out into more ambitious one – to manage uncertainty. But this growth of ambition is not exclusively supported by the increased capacities of human reason. The progress itself did not diminish human anxiety and fear. Much that allegedly is improved only may be a more sophisticated technique to "repress disturbing human experiences" (Hankiss, 2001, p. 9). A hierarchy definitely looks like a haven for existential (and professional) security in front of present uncertainty (which, actually, was never absent). As it is emphasized by Hankiss (2001), a fear is a major factor for human existence,

In order to mitigate this fear, human beings and communities have surrounded themselves – not only with the walls of their houses and cities, with instruments and weapons, laws and institutions, but also – with protective spheres of symbols: myths and religions, values and belief systems, hypotheses and theories, the shining constellation of works of art. In a word, with a brilliant construct: civilization.

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A variational evolution has enabled human beings to possess and improve a great variety of ways to organise their activities. A hierarchy is not a unique solution to achieve the best possible results. Human happiness is a vague notion but a hierarchical structure of modern

organisation is not the only mode of management to satisfy creative and socially responsible professionals. Blurred lines between formal and informal ways of management have given a chance for 'hybridized' social activities like social entrepreneurship (Jensen, 2010). There are many common ideas elaborated for both sciences and management in order to gain more autonomy from formalised frameworks. Interdisciplinary studies may prevent narrowness and short-sighted specialisation, so for modern organization plagued by formal procedures and short-sighted profit seeking a good option is 'synthetical' management (Fontrodona, 2002). 'Synthetic' functions of management can enable pluralism such as allowing follow scientific inquiry thus embracing management inquiry – a new business idea is proposed to be treated like research hypothesis. Besides which, management practice can be enriched by complexity theory (McMillan, 2008). According to her (McMillan, *ibid.*), management should treat a change as normal process and preserve the organisation on 'the edge of chaos' "where the parts of a system never quite lock and yet never quite break up either" (p. 55). It also is important to keep in mind Dyson's remark (1979, 1997) that all quantitative changes in the long run turn into qualitative ones. A hierarchy being available as such nevertheless is not a natural or social necessity. Homo Hierarchicus, like its "cousin" Homo Economicus, is just another rational fiction. It may sound trivial but "trivialities are sometimes not trivial at all" (Hankiss, 2001, p. 271).

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