The Lucas critique: A Lucas critique

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Abstract

The Lucas critique has been and continues to be the cornerstone of modern macroeconomic modelling. In this note we apply the Lucas critique to macroeconomic modelling using deep rational expectations. In conclusion we point out that Lucas’ call for rational expectations models that provide useful economic policy advice has yet to be heeded.

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1 Introduction

In 1976, Robert Lucas mounted a devastating attack on the then common approach to macroeconometric modelling. His lasting and ingenious analysis revealed that the econometric models then *en vogue* lacked what is commonly called internal consistency. Put simply, model forecasts and rational choice were at odds with each other.

Lucas’ critique henceforth gave rise to a new class of macro models which are built on rational decision making on the micro level and deliver results on the macro level that are consistent with the individual choices. Today, the so called “real business cycle”, “new classical” and “new Keynesian” models claim to heed the call for model consistent expectations in order to analyse alternative macroeconomics policies. Currently, the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) variant of these model types no doubt represent the most popular approach.

In this note, we apply Lucas’ critique to the choice of these models. It will be shown that contemporary macroeconomic modelling strategies are in obvious contradiction to rational choice and, therefore, by Lucas’ standards rather useless for actual policy analysis.

2 Lucas’ convincing and successful criticism

Lucas (1976) famously took issues with the dominant econometric approach of the 1960s and 1970s to use one and the same model for describing the working of the economy as well as for analysing the outcomes of alternative economic policies without paying due attention to how people would react to those policies. Ignoring these reactions is a mistake, Lucas claimed, because they would, in fact, impact the model on which they are based. In Lucas’s (1976) own words:
[...] given that the structure of an econometric model consists of optimal
decision rules of economic agents, and that optimal decision rules vary system-
atically with changes in the structure of series relevant to the decision maker,
it follows that any change in policy will systematically alter the structure of
econometric models. Lucas (1976, p. 41)

What followed was a wave of models that achieve consistency between model-based
expectations and the models themselves. This “Lucas-proof” modelling approach turned
out to be so successful indeed (Smets and Wouters, 2003; Smets and Wouters, 2007, for
example) that in 2003, Lucas declared

that macroeconomics [...] has succeeded: Its central problem of depression
prevention has been solved, for all practical purposes, and has in fact been
solved for many decades to come. Lucas (2003, p. 1)

3 Deep rational expectations

Thus, from a 2003 perspective a long and challenging mission had been accomplished.
Back in 1976, Lucas had observed that contemporaneous models were doing a good job
in short-term forecasting but “are meaningless” (Lucas, 1976, p. 24) when it comes to
long-term forecasting.

In the aftermath of Lucas’ paper, already several econometricians were able to show
that this claim was very far fetched to put it mildly. For example, Klein (1985) found
that inflation in the early 1970s was mainly due to exogenous shocks yet not due to policy
shocks as Lucas had claimed. Eckstein (1983) likewise concluded that changes in policy

1 See also Blinder (1988) on this issue.
regimes were only minor sources of structural change in the economy and of forecasting failures. Using the concept of super exogeneity, Favero and Hendry (1992) argued that some of Lucas’ behavioural parameters did indeed not change in response to policy shocks which is in obvious contradiction to Lucas.

These rather statistical arguments against the Lucas’ critique were accompanied by several other issues raised against it. For example, the stability of Lucas’ “deep parameters” (preferences and technology) have been questioned (Solow, 1978) as well as the way in which Lucas advocated the “microfoundation” of macroeconomics (Summers, 1986; Syll, 2016; Murray, 2016) or the ability of agents to obtain and process the necessary amount of information for expectation formation (Klamer, 1984; Tobin, 1981). One may add the fact that the aggregation of individual utilities obtains anything but stable demand or supply schedules (Debreu, 1974; Sonnenschein, 1972; Mantel, 1974) and many other objections which are way too numerous for covering them in due detail.

In the wake of the 2007 / 2008 financial crisis Lucas’s (1976, p. 42) claim that this newer class of models would systematically outperform traditional models that are not based on micro-founded rational expectation came again under attack (Stanley, 2000; Edge and Gurkaynak, 2010) and lost some of its appeal at large. The question thus re-emerges what makes the “Lucas-proof” model class vulnerable to challenges posed by the developments in the real economy and by competing models that lack model consistent expectations.

All mentioned and not mentioned alternative suggestions notwithstanding, one answer is Lucas’ account of the benefits of introducing rational expectations. As has been shown

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2 In fact, criticism of the Lucas critique has now become the subject of research agendas in its own right (Goutsmedt, Pinzon-Fuchs, Renault and Sergi, 2016).

3 Smets and Wouters (2003, 1151) argue that their model is “very close to that of the best VAR models. This implies that the DSGE model does at least as good a job as the VAR models in predicting […] over the period 1980:2 to 1999:4.”
before, Lucas rightfully emphasizes that rational individuals will realise the consequences a policy choice has according to a given model and hence this model must consistently account for the predictable effects of such policy moves. However, this notion leaves unexplained the actual choice of the model. In other words, before formulating model consistent expectations an individual must choose a model to build expectations on in the first place. It is only reasonable to assume that rational individuals do choose also their model rationally.

Therefore, the question arises what would be a rational model choice. Again, Lucas (1976) provides a useful hint. Referring to the standard econometric practice of his day, he notes:

No one, surely, expected the initial parametrizations of [the traditional] models to stand forever. Lucas (1976, p. 24)

By simple analogy, a rational individual would not have expected in 1976, or any time before or after, that the most popular (benchmark) micro-founded, “Lucas-proof” model at any given point in time would “stand forever”. The consequences are, again, far reaching. A rational individual would not only make up his mind about the consequences of a certain policy measure within a given model, it would also account for the fact that this very model would sooner or later be replaced by a better one that might yield different implications of the same policy. We may call this additional layer of rationality deep rational expectations.

Owed to the transitory nature of any economic model, an individual would therefore rationally choose not to place too much weight on the implications of any given model.

Alternatively, one might say that the Lucas critique requires to make the model choice to become part of the model of a rational agent.

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Exactly how much weight it does place remains *prima facie* unknown. What can be safely said, nonetheless, is that it is pretty unlikely that an individual would expect that the implied consequences of a particular given model will fully surface. By backward induction, it will hence not consider the rationally optimal solution of this particular model to offer a sound basis for decision making.\(^5\)

Consider Leeper, Traum and Walker (2017) as a case in point. The authors describe their approach in the following way: “We augment a monetary DSGE model from the class that Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007) develop with a rich set of fiscal details…” (Leeper et al., 2017, p. 2409). The key question now obviously becomes what model is the “right” one for building expectations and policy simulations. In Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans’s (2005) paper the “right” model apparently was Christiano et al.’s (2005) model, while in Smets and Wouters’s (2007) it was theirs. In both these models the rational agents maximise their respective objective functions over an infinite time horizon (Smets and Wouters, 2007, see pp. 1–3 in the online model appendix: [https://assets.aeaweb.org/assets/production/articles-attachments/aer/data/june07/20041254_app.pdf](https://assets.aeaweb.org/assets/production/articles-attachments/aer/data/june07/20041254_app.pdf) while being at the same time unaware of the fact that their employed models would be outdated in no less than two or ten years respectively. This ignorance is, of course, in obvious contradiction to Lucas’ admonition that no one should expect a model’s initial parametrization “to stand forever”.

Therefore, Leeper et al. (2017) do not only invalidate Christiano et al.’s (2005) and Smets and Wouters’s (2007) approaches but they repeat their fundamental mistakes. All their agents posses the amazing skill to optimize over infinite time horizons without actu-

\(^5\) A similar idea has been developed by Frydman and Goldberg (2011, p.63).
ally being able to look further than two years into the future. What tastes somewhat like the proverbial plank in one’s eye has significant implications.

To see this, one might consider a positive fiscal policy shock. Most rational expectations models especially of the real business cycle type have it that the long-run effect of this shock will be no change in output but a rise in the price level. By the virtue of these models the rationally optimal individual policy response is to raise prices immediately thus driving the output effect to zero even in the short-run. In the light of the Lucas critique and deep rational expectations, raising prices may not at all be the truly rational, optimal response, however. This is simply because a rational agent would expect that newer and better models of the economy will sooner or later emerge that might have it, for instance, that the best response could be not to raise prices or even to lower them.

Consequently, there is only one situation in which relying on any given model truly is the rational choice. This situation arises when the ultimate, unanimous “true” model is at hand. Such a situation is, however, for pretty obvious reasons neither plausible nor desirable to ever occur. 6 If the “true” model was known, ingenious researchers like Smets, Wouters, Eichenbaum, Blanchard, Lucas, Leeper and all future generations of economists would stop amending existing models or coming up with new ones to account, for example, for new developments such as the financial crisis. The alternative to this rather unrealistic prospect would be to once and for all restrict the universe of potential models to a set of models with agreed-upon properties. This alternative would, however, mean to put research in a straitjacket which would be the end of economics as a science. Therefore, the ultimate model is not available, neither now nor in the future.

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6 Among the less significant implications we would conclude that many economic journal would instantly cease publishing because everything that could be said about macromodels would have already been said.
4 Lucas-proof squared

Deep rational expectations require that models must not only feature model consistent expectations but also take into account the transitory nature of the model itself. Rationality, therefore, does not only require rational expectations to be applied to the model but also to the model choice. A model has thus to cover rational expectations within the model as well as rational expectations with respect to model selection. This requirement adds yet another layer to the well-known Lucas critique. The problem remains, however, how to achieve that goal.

To the best of my knowledge, research has not yet produced an answer though it is possible to tell what approaches do not work. One of those infeasible approaches is (Bayesian) model averaging, for example. Model averaging does not work because it does not solve the problem of not knowing what future, superior models will imply. So far, model averaging has only be applied and analysed with respect to known models, or class of models. Averaging should, however, be applied to as yet not-knowable models which is, of course, impossible.

Likewise, mainly empirical models like VARs may produce “useful” forecasts even in the presence of structural or policy shifts, but they too can merely serve as an approximation and tentative guide to policy analysis and optimal decision making. Their advantage might be, however, that they trade in some of the first layer Lucas critique for the second because they tend to encompass many possible models (Sims, 1982; Lütkepohl, 2005) while not building on model consistent expectations.

It is also possible to identify two potential ways to make models truly “Lucas-proof”. One either has to give in on rationality, or one should consider uncertainty.

The first option does not appear very attractive because it is not plausible to assume
that individuals would systematically act against their own interests. Other roads such as bounded rationality or rational inattention also have their problems. Bounded rationality, for example, is haunted by the discomfort of assuming that a superior researcher can distinguish between complete and incomplete rationality, but an economic agent cannot. Likewise, in as far as that lack of rationality is owed to rational inattention the item under consideration may not be interesting (enough) for the agent to bother much, so no one else should bother either.

The concept of (fundamental) uncertainty, however, is potentially able to reconcile rationality, model consistent expectations and the Lucas critique. Fundamental uncertainty in the definition of Keynes (1937), emphasizes the possibility of not-knowable events and hence not-knowable models. Since these events and models are not knowable, they cannot follow a probability distribution function and it is neither possible to apply expected utility maximisation nor Bayesian learning or averaging.7

The potential reconciliation based on fundamental uncertainty finally elevates the Lucas critique to an as yet not widely discussed dimension. The message of the Lucas critique is an ontological one. Given the relentless search for newer, better models the ontological view of an underlying truth that waits to be discovered (Mill, 1844) by economists is seriously challenged if not outright rejected. Therefore, the Lucas critique must eventually be regarded a trigger and motivation for a research agenda that aims at integrating radical uncertainty into economic analysis.

7 In order to avoid confusion one should note that fundamental uncertainty must not be mistaken for Knightian uncertainty (Knight, 1921). Knight deals with known events for which probability functions exist whose parameters are unknown and not-knowable. In contrast to that Keynesian uncertainty deals with unknown events for which (consequently) no probability function can be given. Knightian uncertainty is, in principle, accessible to econometric analysis (Schorfheide, 2000, for example) whereas Keynesian uncertainty has not yet be shown to be accessible.
For the time being standard rational expectation modelling should be understood as a means of facilitating decisions in the face of otherwise paralysing fundamental uncertainty. In the medium and long run, however, individual decision making under fundamental uncertainty still awaits a systematic investigation. The Lucas critique should be taken as a strong reminder to shed light on this as yet unexplored problem.

5 Conclusions

The Lucas critique has pointed out the necessity of incorporating optimal, individual decision making in economic model building. A thorough analysis of this demand shows that only deep rational expectations that also take into account the transitory nature of all human knowledge and hence of economic models can truly inoculate against Lucas’s (1976) criticism.

Although it is yet too early to fully understand the impact of deep rational expectations, a preliminary inspection of the available options seem to suggest that Lucas’ critique must be understood as an urgent call for seriously acknowledging fundamental uncertainty in economic analysis and policy advice.

References


